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This paper analyzes slot-based approaches to management of airport congestion, using a 
model where airlines are asymmetric and internalize airport congestion. Under these 
circumstances, optimal congestion tolls differ across carriers, and since a slot-sale regime 
(with its uniform slot price) cannot duplicate this pattern, the equilibrium it generates is 
inefficient. Flight volumes tend to be too low for large carriers and too high for small carriers. 
Under a slot-trading regime or a slot auction, however, the existence of a fixed number of 
slots causes carriers to treat total flight volume (and thus congestion) as fixed, and this 
difference can lead to an efficient outcome. 
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Flight delays caused by airport congestion are a growing problem in both the US and Eu-
rope, and policymakers have struggled to formulate a response. To address rising congestion
at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) took a microman-
agement approach, prevailing on the airport’s two major carriers (United and American) to
cut their peak ﬂight volumes while prohibiting smaller carriers from adding ﬂights to ﬁll the
gap. Similar FAA interventions have occurred at New York airports, initially at LaGuardia
and most recently at John F. Kennedy and Newark airports, where the FAA capped peak hour
operations while gaining carrier commitments to shift some ﬂights to less-congested times. All
of these interventions followed surges in ﬂights spurred by relaxation of long-standing slot con-
straints at O’Hare, LaGuardia and JFK, three airports where FAA-allocated slots give airlines
the right to operate at particular times.1 The piecemeal nature of the interventions points to
a need for a more-systematic approach to managing congestion at US airports.
Recognizing this need, recent FAA proposals envision a future role for prices as a policy
tool in attacking the congestion problem. In announcing the New York ﬂight caps, the FAA
proposed using an auction system to allocate a portion of the available slots, with carriers
paying for slots instead of receiving them for free. Contemporaneously, a position paper issued
by the U.S. Department of Justice (Whalen et al., 2007) endorsed slot auctions as a mechanism
for addressing airport congestion. Following these New York policy decisions, the FAA took an
even more signiﬁcant step by changing its rules on landing fees, which are charged to carriers
for each ﬂight operation at an airport. While landing fees traditionally depended only on
aircraft weight, the new rules eﬀectively allow the fees to vary by time of day. This change
permits airports to implement congestion pricing, with high landing fees charged during peak
hours and lower fees charged in oﬀ-peak periods.
1With these new developments, price-based solutions to airport congestion have gained
credibility, mirroring recent progress in implementing congestion pricing for roads (London
and Stockholm are prominent examples). But the FAA’s decisions have opened the door to
several distinct, and potentially diﬀerent, pricing approaches. While slot auctions represent
one option, a related approach would involve a slot-sale regime, where the airport authority
sets a slot price and allows carriers to purchase as many slots as they wish at that price. Under
congestion pricing, carriers pay a congestion toll that is analogous to the slot price, but under
an ideal structure, tolls are carrier-speciﬁc (depending on airport ﬂight shares) rather than
uniform. By contrast, under a slot-trading regime, the airport authority distributes slots to the
carriers, who trade them at price that is again uniform. The current system at slot-constrained
airports, where carriers can sell or lease the slots in bilateral trades, approximates such a
regime, but the current low trading volume suggests a need for institutional improvements
(see Whalen et al. (2007)).2 Given the importance of airport congestion as a policy problem,
it is important to understand the potentially diﬀerent impacts of these price-based regimes.
The present paper is designed to achieve such an understanding by comparing the outcomes
achieved under congestion pricing, a slot-sale regime, a slot-trading regime, and a slot auction.
In doing so, the paper parallels the analysis of Verhoef (2008)3 while using a more tractable
set of assumptions. The main simpliﬁcation, which follows Brueckner and Van Dender (2008),
is the assumption that carriers face perfectly elastic demands for air travel. This approach
eliminates the ﬂight-reducing distortion arising from the exercise of market power, allowing
a sole focus on the distortion arising from the congestion externality, which tends to make
ﬂight volumes excessive. With market power eliminated and a constant-returns assumption
modiﬁed, the analysis is able to derive parallel results that are simpler and more clearcut than
those of Verhoef (2008). Once the analysis is complete, the two sets of results are compared.
Although a slot-sale regime is less commonly advocated than slot trading or slot auctions,
an understanding of its performance is helpful when evaluating these other approaches. As
a result, a signiﬁcant portion of the paper is devoted to analyzing the slot-sale regime and
comparing its performance to that of congestion pricing, which is known to generate the social
optimum. The diﬀerence between these two regimes arises because of internalization of airport
2congestion, which occurs because carriers at congested airports often operate a large number of
ﬂights (road users, by constrast, operate a single vehicle). This fact means that, in scheduling
an additional ﬂight, a carrier will take into account the additional congestion costs imposed on
the other ﬂights it operates. The appropriate congestion toll then captures only the congestion
imposed on other carriers, excluding the congestion the carrier imposes on itself. While Daniel
(1995) was the ﬁrst to recognize the potential for internalization of airport congestion, this
pricing rule was advanced by Brueckner (2002, 2005) and further explored by other authors.4
A key implication of internalization is that asymmetric carriers should pay diﬀerent tolls.
A carrier with a large ﬂight share at the congested airport, which internalizes most of the
congestion from its operation of an extra ﬂight, should pay a low toll, while a small carrier,
which internalizes little congestion, should pay a high toll. Because a slot-sale regime, with its
uniform price, cannot duplicate this inverse relationship between a carrier’s ﬂight share and
its charge per ﬂight, the regime is ineﬃcient, unable to generate the socially optimal ﬂight
pattern. By failing to account for diﬀerences in the internalization of congestion, the uniform
slot price excessively penalizes large carriers and insuﬃciently penalizes small carriers for the
congestion they create.
Given this pattern, large carriers will operate too few and small carriers too many ﬂights
under a slot-sale regime, provided the number of slots sold is close to the socially optimal ﬂight
volume. But since a welfare-maximizing airport authority, who sets the number of slots sold
in a second-best fashion, may choose a slot total that diverges from the optimal ﬂight volume,
these relationships are not guaranteed in general. The analysis oﬀers some partial results and
a complete characterization in one special case, where the slot total is socially optimal and
the ﬂight volumes of large carriers are indeed too small and those of small carriers too large.
Numerical results show the likely robustness of this result outside the special case.
If the model’s large and small airlines are replaced by symmetric carriers, then the slot-sale
regime’s common price does not constitute an ineﬃcient constraint, and the regime is eﬃcient.
The analysis shows that eﬃciency also obtains when carriers do not internalize congestion,
behavior that Daniel (1995) and Daniel and Harback (2008) claim is realistic. They argue
that non-internalizing behavior emerges in the presence of competitive-fringe carriers, who
3oﬀset through their own ﬂight increases any attempt by large carriers to limit self-imposed
congestion.5
The analysis then turns to a slot-trading regime, where slots are distributed to carriers
and then traded among them at a ﬁxed price (also known as a “secondary market” for slots).
Remarkably, the analysis shows that such a regime is eﬃcient, overcoming the slot-sale regime’s
limitations, provided that the optimal number of slots is distributed. The key diﬀerence
between the regimes is that carriers participating in a slot-trading regime understand that
the total ﬂight volume is ﬁxed by the number of distributed slots, while slot-sale participants
perceive no such constraint, expecting total ﬂights (and airport congestion) to be aﬀected by
their slot purchases. The diﬀering view of carriers under a slot-trading regime generates an
eﬃcient outcome.
The analysis relies on a highly stylized model, but the main conclusions should be robust
to generalizations that oﬀer greater realism. Adapting the framework of Brueckner and Van
Dender (2008), the model portrays a congested airport served by two asymmetric carriers,
with peak and oﬀ-peak periods collapsed into a single period that is always congested. In the
analysis, carriers treat congestion tolls and slot prices as parametric and uninﬂuenced by their
chosen ﬂight volumes. This view is consistent with the usual approach to Pigouvian taxation,
where the government, faced with a market distortion, computes the social optimum and levies
taxes at a ﬁxed rate to reach it. Economic agents, even if they otherwise enjoy market power,
treat such Pigouvian taxes as parametric. Analogously, the airport authority in the present
model has the information necessary to reach the ﬁrst-best optimum via tolls or a second-best
optimum via an appropriate slot price, and the carriers, even though they are nonatomistic,
view these charges as immutable and unaﬀected by their own choices.
In an actual implementation of congestion tolls or a slot-sale regime, diﬀerent behavior
could emerge. For example, implementation of tolls might rely on an iterative approach, where
peak-period tolls are initially computed based on current traﬃc volumes and then adjusted
downward as traﬃc shifts toward oﬀ-peak periods. The carriers, perceiving a connection
between ﬂight volumes and tolls, would then have an incentiveto manipulate the system, acting
on the basis of false, understated demands for airport usage with the goal of depressing the toll.
4Similarly, under a slot-sale regime, the airport authority might take a trial-and-error approach
in setting the slot price, encouraging the airlines to view the price as endogenous and thus
subject to manipulation. The same incentive might arise under a slot-trading regime. If such
manipulative behavior occurs, then the results of the present analysis are not strictly relevant,
calling into question their usefulness as a guide for public policy. However, if the extent of
manipulation is “small,” then the results may still have some practical value. Whatever view of
carrier behavior is correct, the urgency of the airport congestion problem makes any analysis of
price-based remedies, including one based on standard Pigouvian assumptions, a high-priority
undertaking.
Slot auctions are the ﬁnal focus of the analysis. The discussion assumes that slots are
allocated via a uniform-price, multi-unit auction, and in keeping with the non-manipulative
behavior assumed in the prior analysis, strategic bidding is ruled out, with carriers assumed to
make bids based on their true valuations of slots. This assumption, while strongly at variance
with the huge auction literature, may provide an approximation to the actual outcome under
a slot auction. The analysis shows that, without strategic behavior, the auction generates the
same eﬃcient outcome as the slot-trading regime.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 characterizes the social optimum and the
laissez-faire equilibrium, where partially uninternalized congestion leads to an excessive total
ﬂight volume, and derives the congestion tolls required to support the optimum. Section 3 an-
alyzes the slot-sale regime, providing numerical examples to supplement the analytical results,
and then analyzes the slot-trading regime and a slot auction. Section 4 oﬀers conclusions.
2. Basic Analysis
2.1. The setup
The analysis focuses on a single congested airport served by two airlines, denoted 1 and 2,
who interact in Cournot fashion. Following Pels and Verhoef (2004), the model combines the
peak and oﬀpeak periods from Brueckner’s (2002) analysis into a single congested period, an
assumption that rules out reallocation of traﬃc between periods as a response to price-based
congestion remedies. While the airlines experience common congestion, they are assumed
5to serve separate markets out of the congested airport, thus charging diﬀerent fares. This
assumption serves to generate asymmetry between the carriers, a crucial component of the
ensuing analysis.
In order to maintain the simplest possible focus on the congestion phenomenon, the analysis
suppresses the market-power element found in many previous models, including Verhoef (2008).
In these models, a reduction in a carrier’s ﬂight volume reduces the level of airport congestion
while also raising fares through a standard market-power eﬀect. As a result, airline choices
involve both the exploitation of market power and the desire to limit congestion. To focus
solely on the congestion issue, market power is eliminated from the model by assuming that
carriers face perfectly elastic demands for air travel.6
Accordingly, it is assumed that the passengers of airlines 1 and 2 are willing to pay ﬁxed
“full prices” of p1 and p2 for travel in and out of the congested airport, reﬂecting horizontal
demand curves in the two markets. Airline 1 is assumed to serve the higher-price market,
so that p1 ≥ p2. Since passengers dislike airport congestion, which imposes additional time
costs, the actual fares that the airlines charge must be discounted below these full prices.7 To
derive the discount, let f1 and f2 denote ﬂight volumes for the two carriers, and let t(f1 + f2)
denote the extra time cost per passenger due to congestion and the resulting delays, a cost
that depends on total ﬂights at the congested airport. The function t satisﬁes t(0) = 0, t0 ≥ 0
(equality may hold over a range of low traﬃc levels), and t00 ≥ 0 over the function’s positive
range. Taking account of passenger congestion cost, airline 1 is then able to charge a fare equal
to p1 − t(f1 + f2), with airline 2 charging p2 − t(f1 + f2). When congestion cost is added to
these fares, the resulting full prices are p1 and p2.
Letting s denoted the ﬁxed seat capacity of an aircraft and assuming that all seats are
ﬁlled, the total number of seats sold by carrier i is sfi, i = 1,2. For simplicity, s is normalized
to unity, so that revenue for airline i is
[pi − t(f1 + f2)]fi, i = 1,2. (1)
Note that, with the normalization of s, pi becomes the full price per ﬂight.
6In addition to raising passenger time cost, airport congestion raises an airline’s operating
cost by g(f1 + f2) for each ﬂight. Like t(·), the function g satisﬁes g(0) = 0 and g0,g00 ≥ 0.
An airline also incurs operating costs per ﬂight that depend on its own ﬂight volume but are
unrelated to airport-level congestion. These costs, given by τ(f1) and τ(f2), are assumed to
increase with a carrier’s ﬂight volume, reﬂecting decreasing returns to scale (τ0 > 0, τ00 ≥ 0
hold along with τ(0) > 0).
While the analogous τ function in Brueckner and Van Dender (2008), Verhoef and Pels
(2004), and Verhoef (2008) is constant, reﬂecting constant returns to scale (a constant cost
per ﬂight), the assumption of decreasing returns is needed to generate sensible results in the
presence of perfectly elastic demands when full prices diﬀer across carriers. If the cost per
ﬂight were instead constant, the social optimum would involve a degenerate solution in which
only the carrier serving the high-price market operates. Decreasing returns may, in any case,
be a plausible assumption for a carrier operating at a congested airport. While intense use of
runways and other airport infrastructure used jointly by both carriers is the source of airport
congestion (an eﬀect captured by the t(·) and g(·) functions), a busy airport will also have
intense usage of carrier-speciﬁc facilities such as gates and baggage systems (captured by τ(·)).
Such usage may well be subject to decreasing returns at high levels.
Using the above functions, total costs for the two airlines are given by [τ(f1)+g(f1+f2)]f1
and [τ(f2) + g(f1 + f2)]f2. Airline 1’s proﬁts can then be written
π1 = [p − t(f1 + f2)]f1 − [τ(f1) + g(f1 + f2)]f1 (2)
and rewritten as
π1 = [p − τ(f1)]f1 − c(f1 + f2)f1 (3)
where
c(f1 + f2) ≡ t(f1 + f2) + g(f1 + f2) (4)
gives passenger plus airline congestion cost per ﬂight (note that t is multiplied by s = 1).
Given the properties of the t and g functions, c(0) = 0 holds and c 0 > 0, c 00 ≥ 0. Analogously,
7carrier 2’s proﬁt is given by
π2 = [p − τ(f2)]f2 − c(f1 + f2)f2. (5)
2.2. Social optimum
Consider ﬁrst the social optimum. With perfectly elastic demands, consumer surplus is
zero, which means that the social optimum maximizes the combined proﬁts of the carriers.
After adding the proﬁt expressions in (3) and (5), diﬀerentiation with respect to f1 and f2
yields the ﬁrst-order conditions
p1 − τ(f1) − f1τ0(f1) − c(f1 + f2) − (f1 + f2)c 0(f1 + f2) = 0 (6)
p2 − τ(f2) − f2τ0(f2) − c(f1 + f2) − (f1 + f2)c 0(f1 + f2) = 0. (7)
Computation of the Hessian determinant of total proﬁt shows that satisfaction of the second-
order condition is not guaranteed and must be assumed.8
From (6) and (7), a carrier’s ﬂight volume is optimal when the full price pi per ﬂight
equals the marginal social cost of a ﬂight, which is given by τ + fiτ0 + c plus the marginal
congestion damage from an extra ﬂight. This latter cost is computed taking into account the
congestion cost imposed on both carriers when an extra ﬂight is operated. In particular, when
f1 is increased, passenger plus airline congestion costs for airline 1 (given by f1c) increases by
c + f1c 0, while these costs for airline 2 (given by cf2) increase by f2c 0. The sum of the terms
involving c 0, equal to (f1+f2)c 0(f1+f2) ≡ MCD, gives the marginal congestion damage from
an extra ﬂight.
Inspection of (6) and (7) shows that airline 1, which serves the high-price market, operates
more ﬂights than airline 2 at the optimum. Denoting the social optimally values with an
asterisk, f∗
1 > f∗
2 then holds. This conclusion follows because τ(f) + fτ0(f) is increasing in f
under the maintained assumptions, implying that f1 > f2 must hold for both (6) and (7) to
be satisﬁed given p1 > p2. For future reference, let q = f1 + f2 denote the total ﬂight volume,
and let q∗ = f∗
1 + f∗
2 denote its optimal value.
82.3. The laissez-faire equilibrium and congestion tolls
Consider next the laissez-faire equilibrium. Each airline, behaving in Cournot fashion,
maximizes proﬁt viewing the other airline’s ﬂight volume as ﬁxed, yielding the ﬁrst-order
conditions
p1 − τ(f1) − f1τ0(f1) − c(f1 + f2) − f1c 0(f1 + f2) = 0 (8)
p2 − τ(f2) − f2τ0(f2) − c(f1 + f2) − f2c 0(f1 + f2) = 0. (9)
The carriers’ second-order conditions are satisﬁed, and it is easily seen that (8) and (9) generate
downward-sloping reaction functions. Airline 1’s reaction function has a slope between −1 and
0 (f1 is on the vertical axis) and is thus ﬂatter than 2’s function, which has a slope less than
−1. As a result, the laissez-faire equilibrium is unique and stable. As in the case of the social
optimum, f1 > f2 holds in the equilibrium.9
Focusing on airline 1, the diﬀerence between conditions (8) and (6) is the absence of f2c 0 in
the last term. This absence shows that, in scheduling an extra ﬂight, airline 1 takes into account
the additional congestion costs imposed on its own ﬂights (f1c 0), ignoring the congestion
imposed on airline 2 (f2c 0). Thus, while the airline internalizes some of the congestion from an
extra ﬂight, it ignores the impact on the other carrier. Airline 2 behaves in analogous fashion.
With both carriers ignoring a portion of the congestion they create, the total ﬂight volume
in the laissez-faire equilibrium is excessive relative to the social optimum. This conclusion
follows from noting that the locii generated by (8) and (9) in (f2,f1) space, whose intersection
determines the optimum, are both lower than the reaction functions generated by (6) and (7), a
consequence of the larger multiplicative factor in the last term. As result, the socially optimal
point must lie below both reaction functions. This conclusion in turn implies that the optimum
lies below the line where f1 + f2 is constant at the equilibrium level, a line that lies between
the reaction functions on either side of the equilibrium (it passes through the equilibrium point
and has a slope of −1). However, even though the socially optimal point must lie below this
line (yielding a smaller ﬂight total), both individual ﬂight volumes need not be smaller than
the equilibrium levels, as would occur in the symmetric case. For example, the socially optimal
9point could lie to the northwest of the equilibrium (making f1 larger and f2 smaller than the
equilibrium levels). A location to the southwest of the equilibrium is ensured if the degree
of asymmetry between the carriers (the diﬀerence between p1 and p2) is suﬃciently small.10
Summarizing yields
Proposition 1. The laissez-faire equilibrium has a larger total ﬂight volume than the
social optimum. If the degree of carrier asymmetry is small, ﬂight volumes for the two
carriers are individually larger than the optimal levels.
The divergence between the laissez-faire equilibrium and the optimum can be eliminated
by imposition of congestion tolls. The toll per ﬂight is equal to that portion of the congestion
damage from an extra ﬂight not internalized by a carrier. The toll is thus equal to f2c 0 for
carrier 1 and f1c 0 for carrier 2, with both expressions evaluated at the optimum. Thus, the




























is airline 1’s airport ﬂight share and MCD∗ is marginal congestion damage, both evaluated at
the optimum. With imposition of these tolls, f1T1 and f2T2 are subtracted from the proﬁt
expressions in (3) and (5). Assuming that the carriers view the tolls as parametric, as discussed
in the introduction, T1 and T2 are then subtracted from the expressions in the airline ﬁrst-order
conditions (8) and (9), and the solutions to these modiﬁed conditions coincide with the social
optimum.
The key feature of the toll structure is that, because of airline 1’s higher ﬂight share, it
pays a lower toll than airline 2. In other words, T1 = (1 − φ)MCD∗ < φMCD∗ = T2. The
reason is that, since airline 1 has more ﬂights, it internalizes more of the congestion damage
10from its operation of an extra ﬂight than does airline 2. Since less congestion damage then
goes uninternalized, airline 1 can be charged a lower toll. While this toll pattern is required for
eﬃciency, the inverse association between a carrier’s size and the toll it pays would generate
controversy and political opposition from smaller carriers.
3. Slot-Based Regimes
3.1. The slot-sale regime
Alternate price-based approaches to reducing congestion rely on airport slots, with carriers
needing to acquire a slot for each ﬂight operated at the airport. Under one approach, the airport
authority sells slots, allowing carriers to purchase as many as they wish at an announced price.
This slot price is set by the authority to generate the desired total ﬂight volume, and as
discussed above, both carriers treat the price as parametric.
Let z denote the price of a slot and n denote airport authority’s target ﬂight volume.
Then, since the terms f1z and f2z are subtracted from the proﬁt expressions in (3) and (5),
the slot-sale regime’s equilibrium is characterized by the following conditions:
p1 − τ(f1) − f1τ0(f1) − c(f1 + f2) − f1c 0(f1 + f2) = z (13)
p2 − τ(f2) − f2τ0(f2) − c(f1 + f2) − f2c 0(f1 + f2) = z. (14)
f1 + f2 = n. (15)
Eqs. (13) and (14) are the carriers’ ﬁrst-order conditions, while (15) indicates that total slot
purchases (equal to the total ﬂight volume) equals the target level n. Note that (13) and (14)
diﬀer from the laissez-faire conditions (8) and (9) only in the appearance of z (rather than
zero) on the RHS.
The equilibrium conditions in (13)–(15) generate solutions for f1, f2, and z conditional on
n. Let the ﬂight-volume solutions be denoted f1(n) and f2(n). As before, f1(n) > f2(n) holds,
so that carrier 1 operates more ﬂights than carrier 2 for any given n.
Taking into account the dependence of f1 and f2 on the number of slots sold, a welfare-
maximizing airport authority would select n in an optimal fashion, with the goal of maximizing
11total airline proﬁt. The resulting n, denoted b n, generates the second-best social optimum,
conditional on use of the slot-sale regime. The corresponding second-best optimal f1 and f2
values are denoted b f1 ≡ f1(b n) and b f2 ≡ f2(b n). The conditions characterizing b n are developed
below.
When carriers are asymmetric, the slot-sale regime is ineﬃcient, as can be seen by con-
trasting (13) and (14) with the analogous conditions for the toll regime. Under that regime,
z in (13) is replaced by T1 and z in (14) is replaced by T2. Since these tolls have diﬀerent
magnitudes, whereas carriers pay a common slot price, a slot-sale regime will not be able to
generate the social optimum. By not taking into account airline 1’s greater internalization of
congestion, a slot-sale regime will tend to penalize airline 1 too much and airline 2 not enough
for the congestion they create. Thus, the regime will tend to make the ﬂight volume too small
for the large carrier and too large for the small carrier.
Whether these tendenciesendup making b f1 smaller and b f2 larger than the ﬁrst-best optimal
values f∗
1 and f∗
2 depends on the relationship between b n, the optimal number of slots sold, and
q∗, the socially optimal total ﬂight volume. As will become clear below, the relationship
between b n and q∗ is ambiguous in general. If b n happens to equal q∗, then the above tendencies
will indeed make b f1 too small and b f2 too large under the slot-sale regime. But when b n 6= q∗,
these relationships could be disrupted. For example, if b n ≥ q∗, then airline 2’s insuﬃcient
congestion penalty combined with an excessive total number of ﬂights will again make b f2 too
large. But with the ﬂight total excessive, airline 1’s overly severe congestion penalty could lead
to an b f1 value that is either larger or smaller than f∗
1. A formal statement is as follows:
Proposition 2. If b n ≤ q∗, so that the optimal number of slots sold is less than or
equal to the socially optimal total ﬂight volume, then b f1 < f∗
1, implying that the larger
carrier operates too few ﬂights, while b f2 > (<) f∗
2. If b n ≥ q∗ holds, then b f2 > f∗
2, so
that the smaller carrier operates too many ﬂights, while b f1 > (<) f∗
1. Combining this
information, b n = q∗ implies f∗
1 > b f1 > b f2 > f∗
2, so that the slot-sale regime ineﬃciently
narrows the diﬀerence between the ﬂight volumes of the large and small carriers.
The proposition thus shows that at least one of the inequalities b f1 < f∗
1 and b f2 > f∗
2 must
hold, providing a partial characterization of the slot-sale regime’s ineﬃciency.






1) = p2 − τ(q∗ − f∗
1) − (q∗ − f∗
1)τ0(q∗ − f∗
1). (16)
Similarly, after combining (13) and (14), b n and b f1 must satisfy
p1 − τ(b f1) − b f1τ0(b f1) = p2 − τ(b n− b f1) − (b n − b f1)τ0(b n − b f1) + (b f1 − b f2)c 0(b n)
> p2 − τ(b n− b f1) − (b n − b f1)τ0(b n − b f1), (17)
where the inequality uses b f1 > b f2. Now suppose that b n ≤ q∗ holds while b f1 ≥ f∗
1. Since
τ(f) + fτ0(f) is increasing in f, the LHS of (17) is then no larger than the LHS of (16).
Similarly, the last expression in (17) is then at least as large as the RHS of (16). But the
equality in (16) then implies that the last expression in (17) should be at least as large as
the LHS expression, and the resulting contradiction establishes that b f1 < f∗
1 must hold when
b n ≤ q∗. The remainder of Proposition 2 is proved in similar fashion.
3.2. Choosing the optimal n
As seen in Proposition 2, whether the ﬂight volumes of the individual carriers are too large
or too small under the slot-sale regime depends in part on the relationship between b n and q∗.
To investigate this relationship, the conditions determining the optimal number of slots sold
must be derived. The ﬁrst step is to substitute the solutions f1(n) and f2(n) into the welfare
function, which equals total airline proﬁt (net of slot purchases) plus the airport authority’s
slot revenue. Since slot revenue cancels, the objective function reduces to π1 + π2 and can be
written
W(n) = (p1 − τ[f1(n)])f1(n) + (p2 − τ[f2(n)])f2(n) − nc(n). (18)
The airport authority chooses n to maximize (18), and resulting the ﬁrst-order condition is
[p1 − τ(f1) − f1τ0(f1)]f0
1 + [p2 − τ(f2) − f2τ0(f2)](1 − f0
1) = c(n) + nc 0(n), (19)
13where the n arguments of f1 and f2 are suppressed. Note that (19) requires a weighted
average of pi − τ(fi) − fiτ0(fi), i = 1,2, to equal the RHS expression, where the weights are
the derivatives f0




1, (13) and (14) are combined, eliminating z, and f2 is eliminated using (15).
Total diﬀerentiation of the resulting condition yields
f0
1(n) =
2τ0(f2) + f2τ00(f2) + c 0(n) − (2f1 − n)c 00(n)
2τ0(f1) + f1τ00(f1) + 2τ0(f2) + f2τ00(f2) + 2c 0(n)
, (20)
where n arguments on the RHS are again suppressed. Since f1(n) > f2(n), it follows that the
expression (2f1 − n)c 00(n) in the numerator of (20) is nonnegative. Inspection of (20) then
establishes 0 < f0
1(n) < 1, as required for the weights in (19) to be positive.
The ﬁrst-order condition (19) in conjunction with (20) yields b n, the optimal value of n,
telling the airport authority the optimal number of slots to sell. Given the complexity of
(19) and (20), a general comparison of b n to the socially optimal ﬂight volume q∗ appears to be
infeasible. However, a simple statement is available in a particular special case. This is the case
where the τ(·) and c(·) functions are linear, with τ(fi) ≡ θ + αfi and c(f1 + f2) ≡ β(f1 + f2).
In this case, the second derivatives in (20) are zero and f0
1 = (2α + β)/(4α + 2β) = 1
2. As a
result, the weighted averaging in (19) involves equal weights of one-half.
The implications of this fact for the relationship between b n and q∗ can be seen by adding




1)]/2 + [p2 − τ(f∗
2) − f∗
2τ0(f∗
2)]/2 = c(q∗) + q∗c 0(q∗). (21)
With f0
1 = 1
2, it is clear that, aside from notation, (19) and (21) are the same condition.
Moreover, with linearity of τ, the LHS expression in (21) reduces to 1
2(p1 + p2 − 2αq∗), while
the LHS expression in (19) is 1
2(p1 + p2 − 2αn). With the individual ﬂight volumes dropping
out, the two equations directly determine the optimal values of q and n, and the solutions are
the same, with b n = q∗. Summarizing yields
14Proposition 3. When operating and congestion costs per ﬂight depend linearly on
ﬂight volumes, the optimal number of slots b n sold under a slot-sale regime equals the
socially optimal ﬂight volume q∗. As a result, f∗
1 > b f1 > b f2 > f∗
2.
Making use of Proposition 2, Proposition 3 thus generates a full characterization of the in-
eﬃciency of the slot-sale regime. Explicit solutions for the linear case are presented in the
appendix.
A ﬁnal question concerns the magnitude of the slot price z. Substituting (13) and (14)
into (19) and rearranging yields
z = [(1 − f0
1)f1 + f0
1f2]c 0(n). (22)
Thus, the slot price equals a weighted average of the ﬂight volumes times marginal congestion
cost, although the weights are reversed from (19). With linearity and the weights thus equal
to one-half, (22) reduces to z = nc 0(n)/2, and since b n = q∗, the slot price associated with
b n is b z = 1
2MCD∗. Recall that the optimal tolls for carriers 1 and 2 are respectively smaller
and larger than this value (see (10) and (11)). However, b z is equal to the average of the two
optimal tolls.
3.3. Numerical examples
Since further general analysis of the diﬀerence between the slot-sale and toll regimes is not
feasible, this section presents numerical examples to determine whether some of the patterns
seen with linear cost functions persist under nonlinearity. Consideration of two examples is
suﬃcient to establish several points. In the examples, τ(fi) ≡ θ + 4f4
i and c(f1 + f2) ≡
4(f1 + f2)4. While variation in the multiplicative constants in these functions (which are
arbitrarily set equal to the quartic exponents) has little qualitative eﬀect, use of quadratic
rather than quartic functions generates an insuﬃcient degree of decreasing returns unless the
multiplicative constants are very large.
Table 1 shows numerical results in two cases with diﬀerent values of pi − θ. In the ﬁrst
case, p1 −θ = 9 and p2 −θ = 5, while in the second case p1 −θ equals 7 instead of 9. Starting
with a comparison between q values, the upper panel shows that b n < q∗ holds when p1 − θ
15is high, with the reverse inequality holding in the second panel where p1 − θ is lower (the
values are close in each case, however). This reversal shows that optimal number of slots sold
may be either larger or smaller than the socially optimal ﬂight volume, with the linear case
representing a particular instance where the two values are equal.
In each panel, comparison of the ﬂight volumes reveals a relationship seen in the linear
case. In both cases, the diﬀerence between f1 and f2 is narrower under the slot-sale regime
than under the toll regime, with f1 smaller and f2 larger than the respective socially optimal
values. This tendency may therefore be fairly general, holding under a variety of functional
speciﬁcations.
Table 1 also shows the laissez-faire equilibrium, illustrating its excessive total ﬂight volume
and lower welfare level. Note that slot-sale regime achieves around 70 to 75 percent of the
welfare gain generated by the ﬁrst-best toll regime. Observe also that, in both cases, the
socially optimal f1 is larger than the equilibrium level, with the opposite relationship holding
for f2. Thus, the social optimum lies to the northwest of the equilibrium point, a possibility
recognized in the earlier discussion. Additional computations conﬁrm that a more-natural
southwesterly location for the optimum (with both ﬂight volumes smaller than the equilibrium
levels) arises when the diﬀerence between p1 and p2 is suﬃciently small.
The numerical results highlight the main source of ineﬃciency of a slot-sale regime relative
to a toll regime: its tendency to overpenalize large carriers, whose high internalization of
congestion is not taken into account, while underpenalizing small carriers. As long as the
total ﬂight volumes are not too diﬀerent under both regimes, as in the present examples, this
tendency will generate ﬂight volumes that are smaller than optimal for large carriers and larger
than optimal for small carriers.
3.4. When is the slot-sale regime eﬃcient?
Although the results have given a negative picture of the eﬃciency of slot sales, such a
regime is eﬃcient under some circumstances. One such case is where carriers are symmetric,
with p1 = p2. Since each carrier pays the same toll under symmetry, the slot-sale regime
(with its common price) can perfectly replicate the toll regime and thus generate the ﬁrst-best
optimum.11
16Slot sales are also eﬃcient when carriers do not internalize congestion, behavior that Daniel
(1995) and Daniel and Harback (2008) view as realistic. They argue that, when a Stackel-
berg leader interacts with competitive-fringe airlines, the oﬀsetting behavior of these carriers
(which increase their ﬂights in one-for-one fashion as the leader reduces its ﬂights) eliminates
that carrier’s incentive to take account of self-imposed congestion. To incorporate such be-
havior, suppose that both carriers, despite their nonatomistic sizes, treat airport congestion as
parametric, ignoring the fact that the c(·) function depends on both ﬂight volumes.12
With congestion viewed as parametric, the terms containing c 0 on the LHS of the laissez-
faire conditions (8) and (9) vanish. The tolls required to generate the optimum are then the
same across carriers and equal to q∗c 0(q∗) = MCD∗, so that each carrier is charged for the
full congestion damage done by an extra ﬂight (including the damage done to its existing
ﬂights). Since tolls are uniform even though carriers are asymmetric, a slot-sale regime can
again generate the social optimum.13
Summarizing yields
Proposition 4. A slot-sale regime is eﬃcient when (i) carriers do not internalize
congestion or (ii) carriers internalize congestion but are symmetric, with p1 = p2. To
achieve the ﬁrst-best optimum, the airport authority sets b n equal to the relevant q∗
value.
3.5. Slot trading
Instead of slot sales, consider now a slot-trading regime, where the airport authority dis-
tributes slots free of charge to the carriers, who then trade them at a mutually agreed price
in order to adjust ﬂight volumes (this setup, also known as a secondary market, follows Ver-
hoef (2008)). Let n1 and n2 denote the numbers of slots allocated to the two carriers, with
n1 + n2 = n. Letting w denote the price at which the carriers agree to trade slots, proﬁts for
carriers 1 and 2 are now equal to
π1 = [p − τ(f1)]f1 − c(n)f1 − w(f1 − n1) (23)
π2 = [p − τ(f2)]f2 − c(n)f2 − w(f2 − n2). (24)
17Several features of these expressions deserve note. First, if fi > ni, then carrier i is a buyer
of slots and makes an outlay of w(fi − ni) > 0, while fi < ni means that the carrier is a slot
seller, earning revenues equal to the negative of the previous expression. Second, because a
carrier understands that total ﬂight volume remains constant when it trades a slot with the
other carrier, the f1 + f2 argument of the congestion-cost function c remains constant at n,
the ﬁxed slot total.
The equilibrium conditions for slot trading are
p1 − τ(f1) − f1τ0(f1) − c(n) = w (25)
p2 − τ(f2) − f2τ0(f2) − c(n) = w (26)
f1 + f2 = n. (27)
The ﬁrst two conditions determine a carrier’s desired ﬂight volume (and thus the magnitude
of its slot purchase or sale) when faced with the price w, while (27) says that the slot trades
balance. This requirement implies f1 − n1 = −(f2 − n2), which reduces to (27).
The key implication of (25) and (26) is that the expressions pi − τ(fi) − fiτ0(fi), i = 1,2,
are set equal to a common value. Since this same property holds at the social optimum (see (6)
and (7)), slot trading is potentially eﬃcient. The pi −τ(fi)−fiτ0(fi) expressions, by contrast,
do not assume a common value in the slot-sale equilibrium (see (13) and (14)). The reason is
that those equations include airline-speciﬁc congestion impacts (the fic 0 terms), a feature that
accounts for the ineﬃcient distortion of individual ﬂight volumes. With total ﬂights (and thus
congestion) perceived as ﬁxed under slot trading, these impacts are absent in (25) and (26).
To generate an eﬃcient outcome under slot trading, the airport authority sets n, the
number of slots distributed, equal to q∗, the socially optimal ﬂight volume, and distributes
the slots in some arbitrary fashion to the carriers. Then, it is easily seen that the solution to
(25)–(27) has f1 = f∗
1, f2 = f∗
2 and w = q∗c 0(q∗) = MCD∗. This conclusion follows because
(25) and (26) are then identical to the conditions (6) and (7) evaluated at the social optimum.
Summarizing yields
18Proposition 5. The slot-trading regime is eﬃcient. To reach the social optimum, the
airport authority distributes q∗ slots to the carriers and allows them to trade.
Observe that the equilibrium price for slots equals the atomistic congestion toll, MCD∗,
which was seen to be relevant in the absence of internalization. By contrast, the equilibrium
value for the price z under a slot-sale regime was half as large (1
2MCD∗) in the linear case.
Note also that the optimality of slot trading is independent of the distribution of slots to the
carriers. That distribution aﬀects equilibrium proﬁt levels but not the chosen ﬂight volumes.
While much of the previous analysis generalizes naturally to a model with more than two
carriers, the generalization of the slot-trading setup requires some discussion. When more than
two carriers are present, bilateral trading would be replaced by a clearing house for slots, a
structure similar to a slot-sale regime except that slots could be sold as well as bought. The
airport authority (or other market maker) would adjust the price w until slot purchases and
sales are equal. The essential behavioral diﬀerence between this setup and the slot-sale regime
is the carriers’ recognition that, regardless of their choices, the total ﬂight volume is ﬁxed at a
value equal to the total number of slots distributed. As seen above, this recognition is the key
to the eﬃciency of the slot-trading regime.
One could ask whether the same recognition might apply under the slot-sale regime. In
other words, carriers might understand that the airport authority sets the slot price to achieve
a target total ﬂight volume, thereby viewing total ﬂights as ﬁxed. Even though this view might
be appealing, it is not logically defensible given the rules governing slot sales. To view total
ﬂights as ﬁxed, carrier 1 must anticipate that carrier 2 would reduce its ﬂights on a one-for-one
basis in response to its own slot purchases. While this view is correct when slots are traded,
it is untenable in the context of sale regime, where carriers are free to purchase as many slots
as they wish.
3.6. Slot auctions
Consider now an auction system as a means of allocating slots. Since a large number slots
must be allocated, a multi-unit auction is the appropriate setup, and two variants exist. Under
a “pay-as-bid” multi-unit auction (analogous to a standard ﬁrst-price auction), carriers oﬀer
19unit-speciﬁc bids for slots, specifying diﬀerent prices for ﬁrst, second, and later slots requested.
The auctioneer then allocates a ﬁxed slot supply to the highest bidders, making them pay their
winning bids. Since bidders trade oﬀ the surplus gain from a lower price against a smaller
chance of winning, the pay-as-bid system can elicit understatement of valuations. Under a
“uniform-price” auction, which is analogous to a second-price auction, the bidders with the
highest (unit-speciﬁc) bids again win slots, but they pay a common price equal to the highest
bid not accepted. Since, in the event of winning at least one slot, a carrier’s bids on later units
may set the price that is paid (potentially being the highest unaccepted bid), an incentiveagain
exists to understate the valuations of these later units. This latter conclusion is established
by Ausubel and Cramton (2002), and the useful survey by Burguet (2000) provides further
discussion.
Suppose that a uniform-price auction is used to allocate slots, and in keeping with the
maintained assumption of non-manipulative behavior on the part of the carriers, imagine that
strategic behavior is absent, so that carriers act on the basis of their true valuations for slots.
This assumption is strongly at variance with the usual auction modeling approach, but it
may yield a rough approximation to the actual outcome under a uniform-price auction while
facilitating a simple analysis.
As explained above, a carrier reports to the auctioneer a bid function giving its marginal
willingness-to-pay for incremental slots, and without strategic behavior, this function coincides
with actual marginal valuations. Carrier i thus reports a bid function equal to pi − τ(fi) −
fiτ0(fi)−c(n), where n now represents the number of slots to be auctioned. Since this number
is announced in advance by the auctioneer, a carrier’s bid function treats total ﬂights (and
thus the level of congestion) as ﬁxed, as in the slot-trading regime.
Based on these bid functions, the auctioneer then sets a price y such that: carriers bidding
at least y for incremental slots receive them; a total of n slots is allocated. It is easy to see
that the resulting equilibrium conditions are identical to those from the sloting-trading regime,
being given by (25)–(27) with y in place of w. As a result, the previous argument establishing
eﬃciency of slot trading applies as well to a slot auction under the present assumptions,
yielding14
20Proposition 6. With non-strategic behavior, a uniform-price, multi-unit slot auction
is eﬃcient. To reach the optimum, the airport authority auctions q∗ slots.
3.7. The eﬀect of market power
In a closely related paper, Verhoef (2008) analyzes slot-based regimes when demand is
imperfectly elastic, allowing carriers to exercise market power. Uninternalizedcongestion again
tends to make ﬂight volumes excessive, but carriers have a new incentive to limit their ﬂight
volumes in order to raise fares. The net eﬀect of these two distortions is ambiguous, so that
ﬂight volumes in the laissez-faire equilibrium could either be too large or too small. Since
Verhoef (2008) assumes that, under the toll regime, the two distortions must be addressed
using a single toll instrument, the possibility of insuﬃcient ﬂight volumes means that optimal
tolls could be negative.15
In Verhoef’s model, two carriers serve the same market (facing a downward-sloping, linear
demand curve), and asymmetry between them is generated by a diﬀerence in costs. The τ(·)
function is constant in his model (yielding constant returns), the c(·) function is linear, and the
functions diﬀer across carriers in a way that gives one carrier lower costs at any ﬂight volume.
Given the assumed cost structure and service to a single market, the high-cost carrier does not
operate at the social optimum, an outcome that is supported by levying a positive toll on that
carrier. By contrast, the low-cost carrier faces a negative toll (receives a subsidy), which raises
its ﬂight volume and corrects the market-power distortion. Note that uninternalized congestion
vanishes with the absence of the other carrier, making this the only distortion present.
As in the present analysis, a slot-sale regime eliminates the diﬀerentiation of tolls required
to support the social optimum. One consequence is that the high-cost carrier may operate
under the slot-sale regime rather than being forced out of business, an undesirable second-best
outcome. This pattern matches one of the conclusions of Proposition 3 (too large a ﬂight
volume for the smaller carrier), although Verhoef is not able to state an equally clearcut result
given the greater complexity of his model. Nevertheless, the two papers oﬀer a similar verdict
on slot sales by highlighting the ineﬃciency of a structure that imposes a common charge on
asymmetric carriers.
21Verhoef also analyzesslot trading and shows that the trading equilibriumeﬃcientlyremoves
the high-cost carrier from the market. However, unless the airport authority can compel
the low-cost carrier to use all of the slots it ends up holding, the social optimum cannot be
generated. In other words, the authority can issue total slots equal to the socially optimal ﬂight
volume, but the low-cost carrier, even though it ends up holding this many slots, can choose
instead the smaller ﬂight volume corresponding the best monopoly output, leaving some slots
unused.
4. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed slot-based regimes for management of airport congestion, using a
model where airlines are asymmetric and internalize congestion. Under these circumstances,
optimal congestion tolls diﬀer across carriers, and since a slot-sale regime (with its uniform slot
price) cannot duplicate this pattern, the equilibrium it generates is ineﬃcient. Flight volumes
tend to be too low for large carriers and too high for small carriers. Under a slot-trading
regime, however, the distribution of a ﬁxed number of slots causes carriers to treat total ﬂight
volume (and thus congestion) as ﬁxed, and this diﬀerence leads to an eﬃcient outcome as long
as the number of slots is optimally chosen. A slot auction is eﬃcient for the same reason.
All of these conclusions presume the absence of manipulative or strategic behavior on
the part of the carriers, a view that may be inaccurate. Nevertheless, the results provide a
benchmark for the evaluation of slot-based regimes, which may give an approximation to actual
outcomes under more-sophisticated behavior by the carriers. Other aspects of the model are
also highly stylized, but since the principles underlying the results would also emerge in more
detailed and realistic frameworks, the ﬁndings are likely to be highly robust.
A key lesson of the analysis is that a slot-trading regime, where slots are distributed to
the carriers and then traded through a clearing house, is equivalent to an eﬃcient regime of
carrier-speciﬁc congestion tolls. Since such a toll regime is bound to be controversial given
that the tolls it generates are inversely related to carrier size, the analysis generates a clear
presumption in favor of the equivalent slot-trading regime. This conclusion is welcome, given
that trading already occurs at slot-constrained US airports, although at low volumes.16 To
22foster more-active trading, the current bilateral system should be replaced by a central clearing
house, and a slot purchase should confer clear property rights, replacing the current tenuous
arrangement in which slots are ultimately the property of the FAA (Whalen et al. (2007) stress
this point).
Although the analysis shows that a slot auction can also achieve eﬃciency, free distribution
of slots might be preferable given the beleaguered airline industry’s strenuous opposition to
new, cost-increasing charges. Slots could be allocated in proportion to current ﬂight volumes,
and trading would occur when carriers seek to adjust these volumes. Hoarding of unused slots,
meant to deny airport access to a carrier’s competitors, could be prevented by “use-it-or-lose-
it” requirements, which are already in place. It might appear that new entrants (who hold
no slots) are disadvantaged under this system, but their status is no diﬀerent from that of an
incumbent carrier seeking to increase its ﬂight volume, which must purchase new slots to do
so.
Future work could relax some of the stylized assumptions of the model. One limitation
is the absence of any distinction between peak and oﬀ-peak periods, and if this feature were
added to the model, traﬃc reallocation between periods would occur in response to price-
based interventions. While a multi-period model like that of Brueckner (2002) involves greater
complexity, such a model would presumably generate results similar to those of the present
analysis, a conjecture that could be veriﬁed through additional research.
Another limitation of the analysis, mentioned in the introduction, is the assumption that
the airport authority has the necessary information (on carrier congestion costs and passenger
time values) for computing optimal congestion tolls or the optimal number of slots to auction
or to distribute under a slot-trading regime. While good estimates of the relevant parameters
are available, as seen in the carefully calibrated numerical models of Daniel (1995) and Daniel
and Harback (2008), it seems likely that actual implementation of price-based remedies would
involve much less precision, while also relying on iterative or trial-and-error procedures that
invite manipulation.17 Such implementation problems were illustrated by the recent contro-
versy over ﬂight caps at the New York airports, where the carriers argued (possibly with some
justiﬁcation) that FAA caps were much too tight.18 While these obstacles may make achieve-
23ment of the optimum diﬃcult, conceptual clarity regarding the eﬀects of price-based remedies
for airport congestion is nevertheless important, and this paper has attempted to provide it.
24Appendix
In the linear case, the optimal total ﬂight volume (which equals the optimal number of
slots sold) is given by
q∗ = b n =
p1 + p2 − 2θ
2α + 4β
. (a1)
Note that positivity of this expression is ensured if the intercept θ of the τ function is smaller
than both of the full prices, a condition that is assumed to hold. Carrier 1’s ﬂight volumes at
the optimum and under the slot-sale regime are given by
f∗
1 =
(p1 − θ)(α + β) − β(p2 − θ)
α(2α + 4β)
>
(8α + 10β)(p1 − θ) − 6β(p2 − θ)
(4α + 8β)(4α + 2β)
= b f1, (a2)
where the inequality follows from some algebra. Since f∗
1 + f∗
2 = b f1 + b f2, (a2) implies f∗
2 <
b f2. Note that, although f∗
1 and b f1 are both positive, positivity of f∗
2 and b f2 (given by the
expressions in (a2) with p1 and p2 reversed) requires a suﬃciently large value of α. This




Toll Slot Sale Laissez Faire
p1 − θ = 9
p2 − θ = 5
q, n 0.707105 0.694426 0.842159
f1 0.668742 0.550228 0.545672
f2 0.038363 0.144198 0.296488
W 4.96840 4.82512 4.49634
p1 − θ = 7
p2 − θ = 5
q, n 0.706804 0.708284 0.816954
f1 0.562943 0.458862 0.478234
f2 0.143861 0.249401 0.338720
W 3.72792 3.66090 3.46772
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28Footnotes
∗I am indebted to Ami Glazer for very helpful suggestions and to Volodymyr Bilotkach,
Ricardo Flores-Fillol, and especially Ken Small for additional comments. Any shortcomings
in the paper, however, are my responsibility.
1Washington Reagan (National) Airport is also slot-constrained. See Gillen (2008) for a
discussion of the history of the slot system at these airports, and see Forsyth and Niemeier
(2008) for a good discussion of the economics of airport slots.
2Many European airports have slot systems, but while slot trading occurs in the UK, it is
illegal at other EU airports (see Gillen (2008)).
3Erik Verhoef and I began discussing slot-based remedies for congestion several years ago,
and he produced the main elements of a single-authored paper based on his preferred set of
assumptions, a paper recently ﬁnalized as Verhoef (2008). Meanwhile, I recognized that the
diﬀerent approach of Brueckner and Van Dender (2008) could be applied fruitfully to the
problem, leading to the present paper. The paper owes a debt to the original discussions
with Verhoef, and it borrows directly from his treatment of slot trading, as explained further
below.
4See Pelsand Verhoef (2004), Zhang and Zhang (2006), Basso and Zhang (2007), and Morrison
and Winston (2007). For an earlier contribution predating the analysis of internalization,
see Oum and Zhang (1990). For representative studies in the road-pricing literature, see
Small (1992) and Braid (1996).
5Brueckner (2002) and Mayer and Sinai (2003) provide evidence in favor of internalizing
behavior, while Daniel (1995) and Daniel and Harback (2008) provide contrary evidence
against it. A recent paper by Rupp (2008) provides additional negative evidence using an
extension of Mayer and Sinai’s methodology.
6Uncertainty regarding demand or costs is not present in the analysis. For an analysis of the
impact of uncertainty in an airport-congestion model, see Czerny (2008).
7See Forbes (2006) for empirical evidence that airport congestion reduces fares.
8A suﬃcient condition for positivity of the Hessian determinant is c 00 ≡ 0. However, when τ
is a constant, the second-order condition fails, indicating that the optimum involves a corner
solution with f2 = 0.
299Since p1 > p2 holds and τ(f)+fτ0(f)+fc 0(q) is increasing in f holding q ﬁxed, the f1 value
satisfying (8) must be larger than the f2 value satisfying (9).
10This conclusion follows by continuity from the symmetric case, where the carriers’ common
optimal ﬂight volumes are smaller than the common equilibrium level.
11To generate the optimum, the airport authority sets b n, the number of slots sold, equal to the
socially optimal ﬂight volume, q∗ = 2f∗, where f∗ gives the carriers’ common optimal ﬂight
volume (the value that satisﬁes (6) and (7) when p1 = p2). The equilibrium slot price z is
then equal to the common optimal congestion toll, 1
2MCD∗ = q∗c 0(q∗)/2. These conclusions
follow from verifying that, when b n = q∗, the solution to (13)–(15) yields f1 = f2 = q∗/2
along with z = q∗c 0(q∗)/2.
12Brueckner and Van Dender (2008) show how the presumed non-internalizing behavior can
occur using a simple model like the present one, but where carrier 2 is viewed as a collection
of fringe airlines. However, to sustain the fringe’s competitive behavior, their model requires
constant returns to scale, with the τ(·) function taking a constant value. Although decreasing
returns in the present model precludes the use of Brueckner and Van Dender’s approach, the
eﬀect of internalization’s absence can still be investigated by imposing such behavior in ad
hoc fashion, as described above.
13With the terms containing c 0 in the slot-sale ﬁrst-order conditions (13) and (14) vanishing,
it is easily seen that the solution to (13)-(15) coincides with the social optimum when the
airport authority sets b n = q∗. The equilibrium slot price is equal to the optimal (uniform)
congestion toll, with b z = MCD∗. Note that Brueckner and Van Dender (2008) refer to this
toll as “atomistic” given that it would normally apply in a case where carriers are small
enough to ignore their inﬂuence on congestion. This smallness is not satisﬁed in the present
context; hence the ad hoc nature of the approach.
14Eﬃciency also obtains under a pay-as-bid auction.
15Another approach, suggested by Brueckner (2005), is to correct the market-power distortion
through subidies paid at the level of the city-pair market (which can vary according to the
extent of market competition) combined with congestion tolls levied at the airport level.
16Kasper (2008) stresses the overall virtues of a slot-trading regime (a secondary market)
relative to congestion pricing.
17Johnson and Savage (2006) provide “back-of-the-envelope” toll calculations appliedto O’Hare
Airport, showing that even simple methods can be useful.
3018See Schoﬁeld (2007).
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